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Avoidable Unfairness in Tax Law 
and United States v. Burke 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax laws are reputed to be unduly complicated. This com-
plication is, of course, partly due to case law that is both con-
fusing and excessive. However, as the recent Supreme Court 
decision United States u. Burke1 points out, the legislature has 
greatly contributed to the general lack of understanding. The 
following case note discusses this case and the issue of whether 
back pay received for employment discrimination should be 
taxed. Section II examines the background cases and statutes 
which led up to Burke. Section III summarizes Burke. Section 
IV points out Burke's shortcomings and offers a legislative 
solution to consistent and fair treatment of victims of non-phys-
ical personal injury. 
II. BACKGROUND 
On February 13, 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was 
ratified, giving the federal government the power to lay and 
collect taxes on income. 2 Income is defined as "accessions to 
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have 
complete dominion."3 Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code 
requires the taxation of income "from whatever source derived" 
unless the item is specifically excluded.4 It is from these rules 
of law that taxable income is initially determined. 
Section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, the predeces-
sor to section 104(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1989, excluded 
from taxable income amounts received "on account of personal 
injury."5 This exclusion has changed little since 1918.6 In fact, 
the personal injury exclusion received very scant attention in 
1. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). 
2. Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain, No Gain? Slwuld Personal Injury Damages 
Keep Their Tax Exempt Status? 9 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 407, 413 (1986-87). 
3. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (195fi). 
4. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1988). 
5. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988). 
6. !d. 
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early years because individual tax rates were low and taxpay-
ers were few before the 1940's, thus dismissing a need for de-
finitive legislation until taxes became significant. 7 
Section 104(a)(2) was probably initially adopted to cover 
only physical injury.8 However, the courts throughout the 
years have applied section 104(a)(2) to non-physical as well as 
physical injuries.9 This court-created extension, followed by 
Congress' failure to amend section 104(a)(2), arguably consti-
tuted legislative endorsement of applying the personal injury 
exclusion to physical and non-physical injuries. Consequently, 
in 1970, the Treasury described personal injuries for section 
104(a)(2) purposes to be those damages received from a case 
"based upon tort or tort-type rights."10 Thus it was established 
that "personal injury" can apply to both physical and non-phys-
ical injuries. The issue has now arisen of whether back pay 
awards for non-physical torts qualify for the section 104(a)(2) 
exclusion. The section 104(a)(2) test for this issue is two-prong: 
(1) is back pay from employment discrimination awards based 
upon tort or tort-type rights 11 and (2) if the injury is non-
physical, is back pay punitive or compensatory. 12 
The Tax Court has not had much opportunity to decide the 
tax consequences of back pay damages received for employment 
discrimination. However, the few cases have been decided with 
confusion and inconsistency. 
The first resolution of the issue held that damages received 
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were to be includ-
ed in gross income. 13 The 1972 ruling found the damages to be 
taxable because they were a substitute for taxable compensa-
tion. 14 This analysis will be referred to as the "in lieu of what" 
7. Robert J. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury AwarcL~, 19 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 212, 212 (19fiR) as cited in Lorraine S. Boss, Note, Taxation and Personal 
Injury Awards: The Search for Workable Guidelines, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 628, 
631-32 (1988). 
8. Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion over Tax Status of 
Personal Injury Damages TAX NOTES, December 31, 1990, at 1565, 1568. 
9. !d. 
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (amended 1970). 
11. !d. 
12. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (19811 & Supp. I 1989). 
13. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. The I.R.S. held that because the pay-
ments to the employees were made by the corporation based on compensation that 
they otherwise would have received, the amount of the payments are includable in 
gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 61. !d. 
14. ld. 
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test. It is often challenged by a test which examines the defini-
tion of "personal injury." This second test we will call the "na-
ture of claim" standard. 
The only other important decision on this issue prior to 
1986 also adopted the "in lieu of what" standard. 15 Watkins v. 
United States involved the taxation of a racial discrimination 
employment award. 16 The Claims Court judged the back pay 
award includable in gross income, ignoring the "nature of 
claim" argument that racial discrimination constitutes a per-
sonal injury. 17 
In the 1987 case Bent v. Commissioner, the Tax Court 
decided, contrary to previous cases, that the taxability of the 
award depends on the nature of the claim brought under the 
violated statute.18 Because the claim generally involved per-
sonal injury, the Tax Court held that the damages received 
were excludable from gross income under 104(a)(2).19 This de-
cision directly opposed Watkins. On review, the Third Circuit 
agreed with the Tax Court.20 Since Bent had been compensat-
ed for a personal injury, even though the settlement included 
lost wage compensation, the entire award was excluded under 
section 104(a)(2).21 Thus the "nature of claim" test was af-
firmed. 
In 1988 Metzger v. Commissioner examined an employment 
discrimination award to determine its taxation.22 The Tax 
Court, as in Watkins, agreed that the "nature of claim" test 
determined back pay taxability.23 The court reasoned that if 
taxpayers' complained injuries are similar, the back pay should 
be equally taxed despite different statutory remedies.24 Since 
Metzger's injury, employment discrimination, was similar to 
other injuries where back pay was not taxed, the court held 
that Metzger's back pay should be untaxed.25 
15. Timothy R. Palmer, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2) and the 
Exclusion of Personal Injury Damaf{es: A Model of Inconsistency, 15 J. CORP. L. 83, 
106 (1989). 
16. 22:~ Ct. Cl. 731 (1980). 
17. ld. at 732-33. 
18. 87 T.C. 236 (1986). 
19. ld. at 249. 
20. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987). 
21. !d. at 70. 
22. 88 T.C. 834 (1987). 
23. ld. at 852. 
24. !d. at 85fi-fi9. 
2fi. !d. at H5H. 
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In spite of Bent and Metzger's "nature of claim" endorse-
ment, the Tax Court in the 1989 case Thompson v. Commis-
sioner,26 chose the "in lieu of what" standard.27 This case also 
involved sex employment discrimination under Title VII. 28 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the "in lieu of what" test as the 
appropriate touchstone.29 
Burke, the 1992 Supreme Court case, addressed the split in 
the circuits and chose a "nature of claim" standard for deter-
mining personal damage taxation.30 Burke was unique in that 
it narrowed this test by closely examining the available damag-
es of the cause of action. 
III. SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES V. BURKE 
A. Facts 
Therese A. Burke, along with fellow union employees, sued 
Tennessee Valley Authority (T.V.A.) claiming sexual discrimi-
nation.31 Burke claimed that T.V.A. had increased employee 
salaries in certain male-dominated pay schedules, but had not 
similarly treated certain female-dominated pay schedules.32 
T.V.A. filed a counterclaim against the Union alleging, among 
other things, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of con-
tract.33 
In settlement, T.V.A. agreed to pay over $5,000,000 to be 
distributed among affected employees.34 T.V.A. withheld feder-
al income taxes on Burke's allocated amount on the basis of the 
"in lieu of what" standard. 35 
Burke claimed entitlement to the withheld taxes arguing 
that the back pay award was "received on account of personal 
injuries or sickness," and so should not be taxed.36 The Inter-
nal Revenue Service disallowed the claim, and Burke appealed 
to the federal courts. 37 
26. 89 T.C. 632 (1987). 
27. ld. at 646. 
28. ld. at 632-33. 
29. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
30. 112 S. Ct. at 1867. 
31. ld. at 1868-69. 
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B. District Court Ruling 
The District Court ruled in favor of the government on the 
"in lieu of what" theory since Burke sought and received only 
back wages rather than compensatory or other damages.38 
Thus the settlement proceeds were not excludable from gross 
income as "damages received ... on account of personal inju-
ries."39 
C. Court of Appeals Ruling 
The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the test for 
section 104(a)(2) exclusion turns on the "nature of claim" 
touchstone.4° Finding that T.V.A.'s. discrimination constituted 
a personal tort-like injury to Burke, the court found the back 
pay not taxable.41 
D. Supreme Court Ruling 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit.42 Ironically, the Supreme Court also applied a "nature of 
claim" test.43 
The Supreme Court found that the back pay was an acces-
sion to wealth and thus "income."44 The question then became 
whether the back pay was excludable as "damages received ... 
on account of personal injuries or sickness."45 The Court point-
ed out that since 1960, I.R.S. regulations have formally linked 
section 104(a)(2) personal injuries to the existence of tort or 
tort-type rights involved in the claim.46 Thus, in agreement 
with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court decided that if 
the nature of the claim underlying Burke's damage award was 
tort-like, then the back pay was excludable from incomeY 
38. ld. 
39. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988). 
40. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121, 1124 (6th Cir. 1991). 
41. ld. at 1121-23. 
42. 112 S. Ct. at 1874. 
43. ld. at 1870-72. 
44. ld. at 1870. 
4fi. ld. 
46. ld. 
47. ld. at 1870-71. 
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The Court accepted the definition of a "tort" as a "civil 
wrong . . . for which the court will provide a remedy in the 
form of an action for damages.'"'8 The Court placed great em-
phasis on the remedies available in the involved statute.49 
The Court pointed out that harming individuals does not 
necessarily establish a tort-like personal injury with respect to 
tax treatment.50 Instead, the crucial factor is that the claim 
was brought under a statute which didn't allow "compensatory 
or punitive" damages, but only "back pay, injunctions, and 
other equitable relief."51 The Court found that when damages 
were excludable from income the claims were brought under 
statutes that included recompense for: pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, harm to reputation, etc. 52 These were found to 
be traditional harms associated with personal injury.53 Since 
Title VII did not include these traditional harms, the Court 
found its remedies in marked contrast with those remedies 
available under traditional tort and federal anti-discrimination 
statutes.54 The Court thus held that a statute with only back 
pay, injunction, and other equitable relief as available remedies 
was not within the traditional tort-like category for tax purpos-
es, and so Burke's back pay was not excludable from income. 55 
IV. DISCUSSION OF BURKE 
Two problems with the section 104(a)(2) personal damage 
exclusion are exemplified in Burke. First,. Congress' failure to 
define "personal injury.'' Second, Congress' categorization of 
tort damages as "punitive or compensatory." As the background 
section indicated, courts have wavered between various forms 
of the "nature of injury" test and the "in lieu of what" standard. 
This inconsistency was caused greatly by Congress' imprecise 
statute. The obstacles which the statute created, however, can 
be avoided if the legislature amends section 104 to include both 
the "nature of claim" and "in lieu of what" rationals. 
48. I d. 
49. ld. at 1870-72. 
50. ld. at 1872-73. 
51. ld. at 1873. 
52. I d. 
53. I d. 
54. ld. at 1874. 
55. !d. at 1873-74. 
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A The Result of Not Carefully Defining "Personal Injury" 
The "nature of claim" test as applied in Burke, when used 
as the only touchstone, has two undesirable outcomes: (1) ex-
treme dependence on state law and counsel's advice and (2) 
unjustified unequal treatment of plaintiffs who have suffered 
similar injuries. A broader version of Burke's "nature of claim" 
test would overcome these problems. 
1. Two instances of unfairness 
The initial problem with Burke's "nature of claim" test is 
its reliance on state and federal statutes.56 This reliance pro-
duces unequal treatment of equally injured taxpayers. Rather 
than the merits of the victims claims being the touchstone, a 
Burke-like "nature of claim" test turns on where or in which 
state the plaintiffs reside or were hurt, as well as how well-
advised the plaintiffs are in making their initial claims, draw-
ing up their settlement agreement, and choosing to sue in a 
particular state.57 If two identically hurt victims recover, dif-
ferent tax treatment of their recoveries is unjust and should be 
avoided. 
Burke's heavy reliance on statutory listings of remedies 
increases tax unfairness. 58 As a concurring opinion in Burke 
stated, "there are definite parallels between ... a defamation 
action, which vindicates the plaintiffs interest in [a] good name 
[which is not taxed], and a Title VII suit, which ... vindicates 
an interest in dignity as a human being entitled to be judged 
on individual merit [which under Burke is taxed]."59 To tax 
one victim, and not the other, when the injury is inherently 
similar, is unjust. 
2. A better interpretation of "personal injury" 
Burke's dissent analysis offers a better "nature of claim" 
application. It suggests that a critical factor in deciding if an 
injury is tort or tort-like is whether the tort is closer to a con-
56. !d. at 1872. 
fi7. Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developin,:; a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 
WM. MITCHELL 1. REV. 759, 762 (1988). 
fi8. 112 S. Ct. at 18n. 
fi9. !d. at 1877. 
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tractual right interference or a personal right interference. 60 
This interpretation of "personal injury" and "tort-like action" 
doesn't rely on inflexible statutes and looks instead at the reali-
ty of the victim's harm. Thus, this wider construction avoids 
the inequitable results of Burke's analysis. 
B. The New Definition Applied 
Although the above suggestion produces fairer results than 
Burke's test, its direct application results in excluding back pay 
from taxable income. For non-physical injuries, this outcome is 
inconsistent with legislative intent. 
1. Logical result of the new definition 
Once the claim is found to be a personal injury with the 
suggested "nature of claim" test, the harm must then be classi-
fied as physical or non-physical. This distinction is extremely 
significant since the legislature probably meant for physical 
injuries to receive preferential treatment. 
In sexual discrimination cases, such as Burke, non-physical 
injury is involved. Congress, with the 1989 amendment, elimi-
nated the exclusion of "punitive damages in connection with a 
case not involving physical injury or sickness."61 The logical 
inference of the 1989 amendment is that only non-punitive 
damages are excludable from income for sexual discrimination 
cases. The question then becomes: Is back pay punitive or non-
punitive? 
Popular definitions of compensatory damages and punitive 
damages do not clearly dictate the tax treatment of back pay. 
Compensatory damages are those damages which make the 
taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights. 62 Puni-
tive damages are defined as either (1) those damages that are 
to punish the defendant63 or (2) those damages over and above 
the amount necessary to restore the taxpayer's loss.64 
Back pay, when strictly applied to the above definitions, 
can cause strange conclusions. For example, assume the tax-
60. ld. at 1880. 
61. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). 
62. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F. 2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990). 
63. Chapman, supra note 2, at 428. 
64. Mary J. Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Wrong Rule: The 
I.R.S. Demands a Return on All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39, 94 
(1984). 
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payer received $1500 in a back pay damage award, which rep-
resents $1000 take home pay and $500 tax (assume for simplic-
ity taxpayer is in a 33% tax bracket). This is how the $1500 
would have been distributed if she had not been discriminated 
against but normally paid without a lawsuit. Applying the 
above definitions, $1000 represents compensatory damages 
because this amount makes the taxpayer whole. If the first 
definition of punitive damages is applied, then none of the 
award represents punitive damages, since back pay does not 
punish the defendant. Defendant simply has to reimburse the 
plaintiff. He has lost nothing in the "gamble" of discrimination. 
Thus the taxpayer would not be taxed on the $500, although it 
is not compensatory. 
If the second punitive damage definition is applied, howev-
er, since $1000 fully compensates the victim, then $500 repre-
sents damages over and above the amount necessary to restore 
the plaintiffs loss. Thus, if the victim of a non-physical person-
al injury is to be taxed on punitive, but not compensatory dam-
ages, the victim could arguably be taxed only on the $500 (in-
stead of the entire $1500). This would be approximately $165. 
However, if the plaintiff had never been discriminated against, 
she would have been taxed $500. Thus, even under the most 
inclusive punitive damage definition, the plaintiff could gain 
$335. Thus the section 104(a)(2) exclusion, when logically fol-
lowed, can result in a tax advantage to non-physical personal 
injury victims. 
2. Not taxing back pay from non-physical injury is inconsis-
tent with legislative intent 
Tax equity requires that persons with the same income 
should pay the same amount of tax regardless of the source of 
the income. 6" It follows that a person who receives pay from 
uncontested work, and one who receives pay from contested 
work should both pay the same amount of tax, unless the legis-
lature decides otherwise.66 Thus section 104(a)(2) must be 
examined to determine if Congress intended to give the above 
preferential tax treatment to non-physical injury back pay 
awards. 
6fi. Michael J. Graetz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLITIES 17 
(2d ed. l9HH). 
66. Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 63fi, 636 (N. D. Ala. 19R6). 
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a. Legislative intent of section 104. As previously dis-
cussed, in 1989 Congress implied that for physical injuries, all 
damage awards, including otherwise taxable items such as 
back pay, were tax-free.67 This special treatment did not ex-
tend to non-physical injury damages, since punitive damages 
are not excludable when in connection with a case not involving 
physical injury or sickness. 611 Since the legislature seems to 
classify all damages as either compensatory or punitive, and 
since punitive damages are taxable, it follows that the legisla-
ture meant for only compensatory damages to be tax free when 
a non-physical injury is involved.69 Compensatory damages 
are those damages that make the taxpayer whole from a pre-
vious loss of personal rights. 70 The law for non-physical torts, 
then, was meant to fully compensate the victim for her injury, 
i.e., to make her "whole."71 There was no desire to put her in 
a better position than she was before the injury.72 
b. Is the taxpayer made whole? The correct inquiry then 
is whether, if the taxpayer is taxed on the damage award, he 
will still be made whole. 73 This question follows the reason-
ing of the "in lieu of what" test, which looks at individual dam-
ages and asks if the money replaces a taxable or non-taxable 
status? As long as the taxpayer is merely made whole, the 
money replaces a non-taxable status. 
To illustrate the concept of a tort victim being made 
"whole" the example of a plaintiff who loses his leg is often 
given.74 For simplicity, we will assume that the injury did not 
result in lost wages or loss of earning capacity. If the plaintiff 
receives $500,000 for a leg, he has been restored, if only by a 
monetary payment, to the position he held before the acci-
dent. 75 The money recovered has theoretically compensated 
the victim for the value of being physically whole - the value of 
67. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). 
68. !d. 
69. !d. 
70. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F. 2d fiR6, fi90 (4th Cir. 1990). 
71. Malcolm L. Morris, TaxinR Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Ac· 
tions: Toward .. , a Capital Ideal, aR U. FLA. L. REV. nH, 745 (19H6). 
72. !d. 
n. Chapman, supra, note 2, at 42R. 
74. Brooks, supra note 5n, at 770. 
75. !d. 
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having a leg. 76 
A similar analysis applies for one who, in a discrimination 
case, has lost her dignity as a human being entitled to be 
judged on individual merit. The money designated to compen-
sate the victim for the loss of this dignity theoretically restores 
her to the position she would have occupied without the injury, 
i.e., the money makes her whole. The use of money to replace 
what is lost does not justify imposing tax on a person who has 
simply been restored to a status others enjoy tax-free. 77 Thus 
damages for pain and suffering, emotional harm, etc., should 
not be taxed. If the victim is taxed on these damage awards, 
she will be made less than whole. 
Lost earnings, however, are different. Back pay compen-
sates the plaintiff for taxable earnings he should have received. 
"If the earnings had been received, they would have been tax-
able as ordinary income. Thus the past earnings portion of the 
settlement appears to be an includable substitute for ordinary 
income."78 If taxpayer is taxed on the back pay award, he will 
still be made whole. This "in lieu of what" or "wholeness" test 
should become a part of section 104(a)(2) in order to avoid the 
present confusion that compensatory and punitive definitions 
cause. 
3. The solution 
As pointed out earlier, Congress seemed to intend the re-
sult, although not the analysis of Burke. The problem in Burke 
of interpreting tax codes is an inherent problem of unspecific 
law. 
The "nature of claim" and "in lieu of what" touchstones 
both illustrate important concepts of tax equity. These stan-
dards together should form a congressionally mandated two-
prong test for the 104(a)(2) exclusion. 
The "nature of claim" standard initially should screen the 
cases. The non-physical injury cases that pass this first test 
should then be scrutinized by the "in lieu of what" test to deter-
mine whether, if taxed on the non-physical damage award, the 
plaintiff will still be made whole. 
76. !d. 
77. !d. at 7RO. 
78. !d. at 775. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Burke and its historical background illustrate the inconsis-
tency and unfairness of the personal injury exclusion. To avoid 
continuing these problems, the legislature should amend and 
clarify section 104(a)(2). Both the "nature of claim" and "in lieu 
of what" touchstones should be adopted in the modified exclu-
sion so that the legislative intent of section 104(a)(2) can at last 
be realized. 
Lisa Kay Norton 
